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Detection of malicious logic on a hardware device is difficult to detect.  This 
thesis proposes a device driver that emulates a hardware device and that device’s 
software driver.  This device driver attacks the target system by accessing the hard disk in 
order to perform read and write transactions without the knowledge of the operating 
system or intrusion detection/prevention software.  The attacks performed by the driver 
compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data on the target system’s 
disk drive.  The attacks performed by the device driver have a less than one percent 
impact on system performance.  This thesis, while tested in a Windows environment, 
applies to other operating systems (such as Linux/Unix, etc.) and thus has major 
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1.1 Introduction  
Digital security has gained much attention with regards to protecting confidential 
systems from outsider threats (i.e. threats coming from outside the network of resources 
that are being protected).  This type of security, while important, makes critical 
assumptions about the systems that the security mechanisms are attempting to protect.  
One such critical assumption is that the systems that are being protected are themselves 
trustworthy.  However, this is a dangerous assumption, and one that is not always correct.  
This is why protecting confidential systems from attackers has been expanding to 
encompass insider threats (i.e. threats that come from within the network of resources 
that are being protected). 
Handling both insider and outsider threats provides a more comprehensive 
approach to securing computer systems.  In most scenarios, insider threats are comprised 
of software running on a confidential system that compromises the integrity, or 
trustworthiness, of that system.  However, an insider threat that is only recently receiving 
attention is compromised hardware running on a confidential system within a protected 
network. 
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The concept of Trusted Computing is one area of digital security research that 
attempts to address the problem of insider threats.  Trusted computing relies on the 
assumption of a trusted computing base (TCB) in order to provide security assurances 
about the system for which it is protecting.  A trusted computing base is the core set of 
hardware and software that are responsible for providing security to a trusted computing 
platform.  However, this thesis shows that the research done into trusted computing, thus 
far, is less than sufficient for handling all attacks from a compromised hardware 
component. 
Another area of security research that attempts to provide a certain level of 
confidence in a computer system is the research being done into developing a secure 
bootstrapping protocol.  Secure bootstrapping is the process by which the computer 
system builds layers of trust up through the boot process by verifying secure hashes.  This 
area of research also falls short in dealing with the problem of compromised hardware.  
The literature survey shows that due to the basic assumptions of this approach, no 
significant security assurances can be made with regard to the type of malicious hardware 
device that is being proposed in this thesis.  
A third, and much older, area of research that could protect a target system from 
attack is encryption.  Encryption is the process of distorting information in such a way as 
to be unintelligible by eavesdroppers.  The process of encryption is usually carried out 
using one of a variety of encryption algorithms.  In order to perform the process of 
decryption, an encryption key is required.  An encryption key is a piece of data that 
allows the encrypted information to be decrypted back into a readable form using a 
decryption algorithm.  In most cases where encryption is used, the confidentiality of the 
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information being encrypted remains intact until it is again put into an unencrypted state.  
However, the information can still be compromised while the information is in its plain 
text (i.e. unencrypted) form.  In addition, there are cases where some attacks can 
compromise the availability of information even while in an encrypted state.  One system 
utilizing encryption that will be considered is the TPM (Trusted Computing Module) 
proposed by the TCG (Trusted Computing Group). 
The following sections in this thesis discuss motivations to explore the 
implications of confidential systems running compromised hardware.  In addition, an 
approach to the proof of concept attack on a system running compromised hardware will 
be formulated.  A similar, but more limited, attack strategy will be considered as well as 
possible defenses to the attack strategy.  The experimental portion of this thesis will 
involve emulating the functionality of a malicious hardware device and its’ device driver 
in order to compromise information on a target system’s hard disk drive.  The attacks 
from the malicious device will have no effect on system stability and will cause less than 
five percent degradation in system performance.  In addition, the attacks presented in this 
thesis will not be detectable by current application level intrusion/prevention security 
measures. 
1.2 Motivation 
With the globalization of corporations in America, system hardware vendors are 
increasingly outsourcing more work to other countries where their costs to perform that 
work are lower as opposed to having it completed in the United States.  The implications 
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of such a trend on the security of our nation may be greater than anyone could have 
initially anticipated when it comes to technology companies.   
For example, if a technology company outsourced a manufacturing job to another 
company (Company X) in another country (Country Y) that is not on good terms with the 
United States, that country may now have an inroad to spy on our nation.  It is 
conceivable that Company X, in Country Y, having the manufacturing contract with the 
U.S technology company, could include malicious logic in the hardware design they were 
contracted to manufacture.  The most dangerous scenario is one in which the components 
manufactured by Company X end up in computer systems that contain government 
classified information.  These compromised hardware systems could then potentially 
perform cyber attacks on the host system of which they are a part.  These attacks could be 
used as follows: 1) to compromise the integrity of the system by altering the information 
contained on the host; 2) to compromise the confidentiality of the system by transmitting 
data out to a third party; and 3) to compromise the availability of the system by causing 
the system to not provide data as required to authorized systems. 
The experiments portion of this thesis will show that this type of scenario is 
indeed possible on workstation computers.  The following literature survey of this thesis  
shows that this type of attack is extremely difficult to defend against as well as even more 









 The literature survey section examines and discuss three separate topics related to 
this thesis.  The first topic to be discussed is an experiment by Qingbao et. al [1].  In their 
experiment Qingbao et. al. [1] propose a malicious hardware device that acts as a network 
switch.  In the literature survey it is explained how their approach is similar but very 
divergent from the approach that is being proposed in this thesis.  The second topic to be 
discussed is an approach to securing the boot-up process of a computer system to ensure 
a secure state once the operating system is loaded.  This approach is termed the secure 
bootstrapping process.  A specific implementation of a secure bootstrapping process is 
discussed called AEGIS.  In the literature survey section of this thesis it is shown that this 
approach can give very limited, if any, security guarantees against the attack vector that is 
being proposed in this thesis.  The next section of the literature survey looks at the 
process of encryption and how it might be used to protect against malicious hardware 
attacks.  A specific security solution using encryption  is also be presented and its impact 
on malicious hardware attacks is examined.  The final section discusses the feasibility of 
remote controlling the malicious device (MDEV) by a malicious entity.  The focus of the 
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section is on utilizing covert channels to pass information between the remote malicious 
entity and the MDEV. 
2.3 A Similar Experiment 
In their paper Qingbao et. al. propose that hardware is “just as susceptible as 
software to hacker attacks, through inclusion of malicious logic”[1].  Hardware is 
susceptible to attack and unfortunately it is an area that does not appear to be heavily 
scrutinized.  Their thesis seeks to explore a part of the information security problem 
space with regards to compromised hardware.   
In [1], the authors look at the problem from an embedded device perspective, 
specifically a network switch.  Figure 1.1 at the end of this section gives an illustration of 
the device they designed.  They propose a network switch that has a malicious piece of 
hardware, implemented in a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) device.  In their 
implementation, their malicious FPGA reads data as it comes in to the device to be 
buffered in the SGRAM, for retransmission.  Quingbao et. al. designed a number of, what 
they refer to as, “threat commands”.  The FPGA, as it is hooked into the incoming packet 
data stream, checks each incoming packet and tries to match it to one of the “threat 
commands”.  If the packet contains one of the predetermined “threat commands”, the 
FPGA alters the data in the Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory 
(EEPROM) chip.  This causes the device configuration to be altered, and the switch to 
change its behavior.  For example, given a certain “threat command”, the switch 
configuration will be altered and the device configuration will change, causing the switch 
to broadcast the data stream between port 1 and 2 to all ports [1].  Qingbao et. al. make 
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the claim that this type of attack is “undetectable using traditional testing and verification 
tools”.  Due to the fact that it is the device itself that is malicious, and most, if not all, 
traditional techniques would be searching for an outside attack on the device, this claim 
definitely has merit.  They go on to quantify their claim to extend to all malicious 
hardware insider threats when they make the statement, “As the appearance of hardware 
threat, information security is confronted with huge challenge, because there is no 
effective way to detect and defend hardware threat”[1]. 
This thesis explores a similar part of the information security problem space as 
[1], but with more flexibility about the type of target that can be compromised.  This 
thesis proposes a malicious device with the capability to attack a workstation computer as 
opposed to an embedded device.  Where the device proposed by [1] is very limited in its 
capability, the device proposed by this thesis targets any storage device that is connected 
to a PCI-E bus on a Personal Computer (PC) workstation.  Where data over network is 
often encrypted, data flowing between devices on a PC is usually not; however, there are 
a few exceptions that will be discussed later in this literature review.  This implies the 
device proposed by this thesis is more likely be able to compromise the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the data that it is gathering, where often, the only attack the 
device proposed by [1] is able to perform is a Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
compromising only the availability of data flowing from it. 
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Figure 1 Illustration of the device built by (Li, Gao, & Xu, 2008) 
 
2.4 Secure Bootstrap 
One possible approach to the problem of compromised hardware on a security 
system, is securing the bootstrapping process of the system.  Bootstrapping is a term 
assigned to the process of initialization as it relates to digital devices.  From the time a 
device is powered on, up to the point the main software loop takes control is referred to 
as the bootstrapping process.  In the field of digital security, the process of bootstrapping 
the operating system on workstations is usually considered a trusted process.  However, 
[2] makes the case that a higher computational abstraction layer, such as the operating 
system, cannot be assumed secure if it was loaded by a lower computational abstraction 
layer, such as the BIOS, that has no security mechanisms in place.  “Integrity of a layer 
can be guaranteed if and only if: 1. the integrity of the lower layers is checked, and 2. 
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transitions to higher layers occur only after integrity checks on them are complete”[2].   
They go on to make the statement that if the two previously mentioned conditions are not 
met, “as they typically are not in the bootstrapping (initialization) of a computer system, 
no integrity guarantees can be made”[2].  The authors seek to make these security 
guarantees through the use of their proposed system, AEGIS.   
The authors define AEGIS as a secure bootstrap process that is able to ensure 
bootstrap code integrity.  AEGIS uses a “chain of integrity checks”[2] from power-on, all 
the way through the bootstrapping process up to the point that the operating system is 
loaded.  The AEGIS boot process is split into two logical divisions.  In the first phase, the 
AEGIS process performs a checksum on its address space to protect against ROM 
failures.  If this process was successful, then a cryptographic hash of the second logical 
section is computed and the verified against a stored signature.  Upon successful 
validation, control of the boot process is passed to the second logical division [2].  At this 
point the second logical division of the boot process begins.  With each expansion ROM 
that needs to be executed, a hash function in computed and checked against a stored 
signature for that expansion code.  When each expansion ROM has been verified, the 
BIOS passes control up to the operating system bootstrap code.  The operating system 
core code (operating system kernel) then takes over after it has been verified by the boot 
block [2].  At this point the authors make the claim that the boot process is guaranteed to 
end up in a secure state.  In addition, “no code is executed unless it is either explicitly 
trusted or its integrity is verified prior to its use” [2].   
For most scenarios this process would seem to be able to provide reasonable 
assurances as to the security of the system when the operating system takes control.  
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However, if the attacker is a middle man somewhere in the supply chain, as is assumed in 
this thesis, this security procedure does not provide adequate protection from hardware-
based attack vectors.  For example, if the attacker has modified the logic of the hardware 
on a PCI-e device, the AEGIS system makes no provision to safeguard against this 
device.  This means that the AEGIS process would assume that the operating system was 
in a secure state.  However, the system as a whole would be compromised at a lower 
abstraction level, and thus the system user would have a false sense of security.  In fact, 
the authors of the AEGIS system formally make the assumption that much of the 
hardware is trusted.  “The first assumption upon which the AEGIS model is based is that 
the motherboard, processor, and a portion of the system ROM (BIOS) are not 
compromised, i.e., the adversary is unable or unwilling to replace the motherboard or 
BIOS” [2].  In their assumptions, the authors of AEGIS did not explicitly mention that 
they assumed the trustworthiness of the system expansion devices’ hardware.  Therefore, 
it is apparent that this scenario was not considered.  Due to these observations, it can be 
seen that the approach taken in the experiments of this thesis would be able to exploit a 
system using the AEGIS methodology and, therefore, it is not a solution to the attack 
vector we are proposing. 
An extension was proposed by [3], to the AEGIS architecture with the goal of 
securing the “firmware of all devices in the computer, not just devices that are accessible 
by the host CPU” [3].  The attack vector being proposed by the experiments of this thesis 
is one that is being taken into account by Hendricks, et. al.  This makes their security 
mechanisms a possible solution to this thesis approach.  It will be shown that in spite of 
the fact that the Hendricks, et. al.  are attempting to protect the host system from 
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compromised expansion devices, our attack vector is still a valid one.  In fact, their 
approach may provide no security at all against an attack from our proposed system. 
Hendricks et. al. make the statement that “Both the [AEGIS approach] and TCG 
based approaches share a CPU-centric view of the system that is inadequate for 
establishing a trustworthy system”.  They go to mention that these approaches do not 
defend against attacks that utilize the processing abilities of peripheral devices.  “Though 
peripherals and memory are implicitly proposed to be a part of the TCB, we do not 
believe they are currently adequately verified”[3].  The aim of Hendricks et al. is to 
protect against hardware compromise.  They approach the problem by attempting to 
verify the authenticity of the firmware on peripheral devices of the host system.  The 
system “must ensure that its firmware is signed and verified at startup just like the rest of 
the executable code, and it must verify its children”[3].   
In spite of the fact that the extension proposed by Hendricks et al. is explicitly 
supposed to provide a layer of security against compromised hardware, it will not provide 
any protection against the attack vector being proposed here.  For example, if the attacker 
has modified the logic of the hardware on a PCI-e device, then the checksum in the BIOS 
against the code for that firmware will pass.  This is because that code would come from 
the trusted source from which the digital signature was originally calculated.  It is the 
hardware logic that has been compromised, not the firmware on the device.  Therefore, 
the AEGIS software with the extension proposed by Hendricks et al. will not provide 
protection against the hardware attack that is being proposed by this thesis. 
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2.5 Encryption 
This section examines encryption, in general, as a possible defense against the 
attack vector proposed in this thesis.  In addition, specific security approaches utilizing 
encryption that aim to guard against hardware attacks will be reviewed.  However, it will 
be shown that in-spite of the fact that encryption is used to safeguard the host system; 
various attacks can still be performed that compromise the systems state of security. 
Encryption is the process of changing information into an unusable state using an 
algorithm of some kind.  While in the encrypted state, it is extremely difficult to be able 
to read the original information from the encrypted data (ciphertext).  The characteristic 
of the data that encryption is protecting is confidentiality.  The point of encryption is to 
make sure that the ciphertext is not read by anyone that does not have the special 
encryption information known as the cryptographic key.  With any security measures in 
place that use encryption to protect the hardware, compromising the confidentiality of the 
data could prove difficult even with the sophisticated attack vector that is being proposed 
in this thesis.  However, that does not mean that it would be impossible.   
There are two types of encrypted data on a computer system.  There is encrypted 
data that is saved on some type of storage device, and there is encrypted data that is in 
transit from one device to another.  However, it is important to note that at some point, in 
order for the information contained within the ciphertext to be useful, the ciphertext is 
going to have to be unencrypted in order for the information to be processed by some 
device on the host system; it is at this point where the data is once again vulnerable. 
For example, if the data is stored in an encrypted state on a hard disk it is 
unusable without the decryption key.  However, when it is transferred to some device for 
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processing, it must be unencrypted.  If that device is trusted, as is the case in the proposed 
attack, then the host should have no problem passing the data to the device and allowing 
the device to process the data while it is unencrypted.  We assume in the previous 
example that the data was in an encrypted state as it transitioned from storage on the hard 
disk to the device for processing.  This scenario does not pose any security guarantees 
with regard to a compromised hardware device that is trusted on the host. 
Trusted computing is one attempt to protect computing systems from insider 
threats as well as outsider threats.  The Trusted Computing Group (TCG), formed from 
the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance in 2003, has proposed a number of 
specifications that could be implemented to form a root core of trust on a host [4].  The 
specification that is most relevant to the work being done here is the specification of the 
Trusted Computing Module (TCM).  The TCM is described as a “low performance 
cryptographic coprocessor”[4], and is “assumed to be the ‘trust anchor’ in a computing 
platform”[5].  TPMs are usually shipped as a component of the motherboard, but can be 
located on expansion cards as well [5].  Together with the host CPU, the TPM provides 
the host system with ability to encrypt and decrypt data as it flows throughout the 
computer.  The TPM has a cryptographic co-processor, with the ability to perform key 
generation, encryption/decryption, random number generation, and hashing as well as 
other cryptographic functionality [6].  “The TPM uses these capabilities to perform 
generation of random data, generation of asymmetric keys, signing and confidentiality of 
stored data” [6]. 
In spite of the fact that the TPM has all of this cryptographic functionality, 
encryption, as was stated in the introduction to this section, cannot provide protection 
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against all possible attacks.  It would still be very easy for a malicious piece of hardware 
to overwrite data on the hard disk of the host, thus compromising the availability of the 
data.  In addition, with the attack scenario presented here, we assume that the malicious 
device is trusted from the manufacturer, and thus the TPM will allow data to be read by 
the device.  Therefore, the confidentiality of the device would also be compromised by 
the attack vector being presented.  If the malicious device wanted to write data back to 
some storage device as well, that would also be permitted by the TPM.  If there were, in 
fact, some policy that notified the host when data was altered, in memory or on a storage 
device, by some component other than the CPU, the integrity compromise would be 
discovered.  However, in spite of this fact, the integrity of the data would still be 
compromised and it would be very difficult to discover the culprit.  There are also 
vulnerabilities in the TPM itself.  As [6] point out, “the communication channel between 
TPM and CPU is mainly unsecured”.  A malicious piece of hardware could take 
advantage of the insecure data flowing between the TPM and CPU.  However, this is not 
the approach that is taken in the presented attack scenario. 
It can be seen that encryption alone is not the solution to the attack scenario that is 
being presented.  Even in the case of hardware devices that implement security solutions 
using encryption, such as the TPM, the host system is still vulnerable.   
2.6 Confidential Communication 
Being able to transfer data to and from the MDEV is a high priority.  This section 
will discuss the feasibility of confidential remote communication with the MDEV 
through the use of covert channels.  A covert channel is a “path of communication that 
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was not designed to be used for communication”. [10]  In other words a covert channel is 
a mechanism for passing information over a media secretly where that information was 
not intended to flow.  Due to the remote nature of the malicious entity utilizing the 
MDEV for exploitation, the TCP/IP stack will be considered the medium in which the 
covert channel shall be embedded. 
A covert channel may be implemented in a variety of ways.  The first type of 
covert channel that will be discussed here is a storage channel.  A storage channel allows 
communication, “by modifying a stored object.  This covert channel involves the direct 
or indirect writing to a storage location by one process and the direct or indirect reading 
of the storage location by another process.”[10]  By modifying the data in a TCP/IP 
packet from the MDEV, and the remote entity retrieving the data, a covert storage 
channel is being created.  [10] names multiple TCP/IP header fields that may modified to 
embed data for covert transmission.  Those fields include “Type of Service”, “IP 
Identification”, and “TCP Sequence Number” to name a few. 
In their paper Ray and Mishra [11] describe a covert storage channel they have 
implemented based on the internet protocol (IP).  The authors insist that their covert 
channel could be built “over any IP-based channels” [11]; however, in their publication 
they focus on an ICMP Echo-Request packet.  ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol)  
packets are used to by networked computers to gather information about other computers 
on the network.  An ICMP Echo-Request packet is sent when the “ping” program is run.  
These packets are returned to the requesting networked computer on which the ping 
program is being executed in order to gather status information about another networked 
computer.  By choosing the ICMP Echo-Request packet as the storage channel, the 
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authors of [11] hope to provide a covert channel that is very difficult to discover.  Ray 
and Mishra use two covert channels in one ICMP Echo-Request packet in order to keep 
the size of the covert channel low to avoid detection.  The authors go on to make the 
statement that “by simply inspecting all packets it will not be possible for the 
intermediary to decide with certainty that a particular packet is carrying some covert data 
and not normal traffic generated by the end hosts” [11].  Ray and Mishra go on to 
conclude that they have created a covert channel that allows for 5 bytes of data per ICMP 
Echo-Request packet and that according to preliminary analysis “it is not possible to 
detect this covert channel based on statistical analysis of sent data” [11]. 
In many cases the security policy on a network will disallow or flag ICMP 
packets flowing outside the local area network (LAN).  In this case it may be more 
appropriate to design a covert channel that is based on another type of network traffic 
than ICMP.  Sellke et. al. have developed a covert channel using TCP/IP that utilizes 
timing as opposed to storage space to implement the covert channel and is thus referred 
to as a timing covert channel.  This type of covert channel would be able flow outside the 
LAN and would be difficult to detect due to the fact that the contents of the packet are not 
altered.  Information is leaked based on the timing of the packet arrival on the receiving 
end of the channel.  In fact, the authors make the statement that “the traffic patterns of the 
covert timing channel can be made computationally indistinguishable from that of normal 
traffic, which makes detecting the communication virtually impossible” [12]. 
It has been shown that there are multiple ways in which to construct a covert 
channel to facilitate leaking information from a secure system.  The TCP/IP stack can be 
exploited to contain a covert storage channel, as seen in [11], or a covert timing channel, 
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as seen in [12].  In both cases information was leaked from the compromised host to a 
remote host.  In [12] it was shown that a low bandwidth timing channel was utilized to 
not only pass information but also be difficult to detect.  These two examples show that 










In this section,  a high level view of the target system architecture is presented.  
Also to be discussed is the process of data flow throughout the target system and how that 
data is retrieved by the malicious hardware device thus compromising the data on the 
target system. 
The target system for this thesis is an x86 general purpose computer.  By using a 
common computing platform, it is apparent that the implications of this experiment are 
widespread.  The target system is composed of a motherboard, Intel 32-bit processor, 
2GB of random access memory (RAM), a serial advanced technology attachment 
(SATA) connected hard drive, and a network interface card (NIC).  In a real world attack 
the NIC would act as the malicious hardware that will compromise the target system.  For 
the purposes of these thesis experiments, the NIC (i.e. malicious device) is implemented 
using a Windows device driver (WDD).  Figure 2 shows a conceptual representation of 
the target system with the proposed malicious hardware device already installed. 
Figure 2 shows MDEV transactions with the host system’s host bus adapter 
(HBA), also deemed the disk controller.  Each item in the image shown in Figure 2 
represents some component of the x86 host (target) system.  The largest item in the image 
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is the target x86-system itself.  Some of the more common components of the x86 
computing platform include the item labeled ‘Memory’ which represents the actual RAM 
present on the target system and the item labeled ‘CPU’ which represents the central 
processing unit of the target.  The lines connecting the CPU to the Root Complex 
represent the connection between the CPU and the North Bridge of the Root Complex.  
This connection is called the Front Side Bus (FSB).  The lines connecting the hard disk 
controller, root complex, and MDEV represent the PCI-e bus.  The lines connecting the 
Memory with the Root Complex are the memory bus.  The component labeled ‘Root 
Complex’ does not actually correspond to a physical piece of hardware in the system.  
Instead, the Root Complex represents a subset of the functionality of the North Bridge 
and South Bridge which together comprise the chipset.  Its relevance to this thesis has to 
do with the routing of disk accesses throughout the target system.  The functionality of 
the Root Complex that is relevant to this thesis is that functionality with which the Root 
Complex takes a given memory address or an address range and routes the address to an 
address in RAM or to an address on a peripheral device on the host system.  The item 
labeled ‘MDEV’ represents the malicious NIC.  All of these components are relevant to 
how the target system is compromised.   
In addition to showing the components involved in the experiments of this thesis, 
Figure 2 also shows how data flows between those components.  In Figure 2 the MDEV 
initiates a read from the disk drive to the Root Complex.  This initial disk read request is 
labeled as ‘1’ in the figure.  The Root Complex then recognizes the address range 
specified by the MDEV as being memory mapped from the HBA.  Then the Root 
Complex reads the contents of RAM at the address range, represented in the path labeled 
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‘2’, and makes the data available to the MDEV.  Since the AHCI space of the HBA is 
mapped into system memory, the flow of data portrayed in Figure 2 occurs through the 
use of read/write transactions from/to host system memory.  This concept will be 
elaborated upon in Chapter four.   
 
 
Figure 2 Host/Target System High Level Architectural View 
 
 
Figure 2 also shows how data transactions can occur on the target system without 
the knowledge of the CPU and thus the OS as well.  The fact that the CPU and OS have 
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not been alerted to the memory/hard disk read is one reason why this malicious hardware 
is successful at not being detected. 
Once the data has been retrieved from the host system and stored in the on-board 
memory of the MDEV, it can then be transmitted to a malicious entity outside the 
network.  The malicious device also has the capability to request instructions from a 
malicious entity remotely.  Due to the fact that the malicious hardware device is acting as 
the host system’s network interface card, it could implement any number of protocols to 
communicate with someone outside the network on which it resides.  For example, one 
such communication protocol in which the malicious device receives instructions could 
be in the form of a simple web GET request.  The FPGA/NIC could send out intermittent 
GET requests from a specified source.  The response could be encoded with the 
instructions for the FPGA/NIC to perform some action (i.e. read data from memory), thus 
compromising the host system.  By using the hyper text transfer protocol (HTTP) the 
routers and switches will simply allow the transaction to pass through the network as 
legitimate web traffic.  To further hide the actions of the malicious device, the secure 
hyper text transfer protocol (https) could be used.  This would encrypt the payload data of 
the communication packets flowing between the malicious device on a compromised host 
system and the malicious entity providing the device with instruction. 
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3.3 Implementation details  
 
3.3.1 PCI Express   
PCI Express (PCI-e) is a data transmission media used in computers systems to 
send and receive data between devices (i.e. CPU, Hard disk, Video card).  The overall 
PCI-e bus architecture works much like a switched Ethernet network.  The physical PCI-e 
bus itself is composed of wires, switches, and endpoints (i.e. PCI-e devices).  The wires 
connecting two PCI-e devices are referred to as a Link.  “A Link consists of either x1, x2, 
x4, x8, x12, x16, or x32 signal pairs in each direction”[9].  It is up to the designers of the 
system as to how many signal pairs to use as the interconnect on the PCI-e bus.  Switches 
act in much the same way that an Ethernet switch would act.  On a high level, the 
switches on a PCI-e bus route PCI-e traffic between endpoints and between endpoints 
and the Root Complex.  Each switch is composed of multiple ports.  One upstream port, 
and multiple downstream ports.  Each downstream port connects to either an endpoint or 
another switch.  The upstream port connects the switch directly to the Root Complex or 
indirectly to the Root Complex via another switch.  The endpoints in the PCI-e 
architecture refer to the actual peripheral devices that want to communicate over the PCI-
e bus.  For example, many video and sound cards can be designed in such a way as to use 
the PCI-e bus of a computer system to communicate with the host. 
The traffic that passes over the PCI-e bus is composed of packets.  “PCI Express 
employs packets to accomplish data transfers between devices”[9].  These packets are 
called Transaction Layer Packets (TLPs).  The TLPs are composed of multiple fields, 
each appended by various stages of transmission.  The fields of a TLP are the Start, 
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Sequence Number, Header, Data, ECRC, LCRC, and End fields.  Figure 3 shows a 
conceptual representation of a TLP. 
 
 
Figure 3 PCI-e Transaction Layer Packet [9] 
 
 
 The header field of the TLP contains important information for routing the packet 
over the PCI-e bus.  The TLP header consists of three double words (DW).  When talking 
about PCI-e, a word refers to a 16-bit value; therefore, a DW is a 32-bit value.  As Figure 
3 shows, the header field contains the address of the device that the TLP is to be routed to 
as well as the address of the requester, or sender, of the packet.  For example, if a read 
request is sent to device B from device A, the address of device B will be in the address 
field and the A’s ID will be in the Requester ID field. 
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3.3.2 ATA Disk Controller 
ATA is a data transfer interface for various storage devices.  There are two major 
categories of ATA interface.  The first is Parallel ATA and the second is Serial ATA 
(SATA).  SATA is the type of interface that is used to connect the hard drive to the PCI-e 
bus on the target system.  The SATA disk controller connects the hard disks on computer 
systems to the PCI-e bus.  It is the disk controller (Host Bus Adapter) that provides the 
interface to the PCI-e bus.  The host bus adapter (HBA) provides multiple block address 
registers (BARs) that are used for various things.  BAR5, also called ABAR, is the AHCI 
base address register.  It is this BAR that the MDEV manipulates in order insert 
commands to be executed by the HBA without the knowledge of the operating system. 
In addition to the base address registers, AHCI also requires that the host 
operating system have a number of data structures setup.  These data structures include 
the command list and command table.  The command list is a queue of command 
headers.  Figure 5 provides a conceptual representation of the command list structure.  
The command headers, shown in Figure 6, contain information such as the base address 
of the command table, the bit to determine a read or a write, and the length and size of the 
physical region descriptor table.  The command table, shown in Figure 7, contains the 
Command Frame Information Structure (CFIS) as well as the physical region descriptor 
table.  The role of the physical region descriptor table is to keep track of the location in 
memory where data from a read transaction is stored.  Figure 4 displays a conceptual 
layout of the HBA’s AHCI base address register.  Here it becomes apparent that the 
ABAR contains offsets 100h – 1100h that are labeled Port 0 to Port 31.  Each port 
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corresponds to a hard disk connected to the HBA.  Every port address contains pointers 
into system memory where each port’s command list is stored. 
The target system being used employs a protocol called Native Command 
Queuing.  Native Command Queuing (NCQ) enables the hard disk to service multiple 
commands from the host.  When setting up commands for an HBA that supports NCQ, 
queued commands and non-queued commands cannot be mixed.  In the AHCI BAR, each 
port address points to a command list.  That command list contains the queue of 
commands that the device executes. 
 
 
Figure 4 HBA ABAR Layout [13] 
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Figure 5 AHCI Command List Structure [13] 
 
 
Figure 6 AHCI Command Header Structure [13] 
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Figure 7 AHCI Command Table Structure [13] 
 
3.3.3 Malicious Hardware Device 
The malicious device that could be used in to perform the attacks on the host 
system could be implemented in a number of ways.  By using this device, it can be shown 
that an attacker with the intention of compromising a system using the approach 
presented in this thesis will be able to do so with little chance of discovery. 
The MDEV would have all of the logic to perform these system attacks built 
directly into the logic.  It is the job of the MDEV to setup up the PCI-e interface and 
initialize the base address registers to be used for communication with the host machine.  
The MDEV could potentially receive instructions from the remote malicious entity and 
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then execute the specified attack on the host system.  If the MDEV is instructed to read a 
chunk of host memory or a sector of the hard disk, then it will do so via a direct memory 
access (DMA) read.  This type of read transaction performs a read on a portion of host 
memory that could be greater than one 32-bit value.  The data would be read into the 
MDEV’s base address registers that have been mapped to the host memory address space.  
At this point the system has been compromised.  Confidential data has been read into the 
MDEV, which can then do any number of things with the data.  
For the experimental portion of this thesis, the MDEV is emulated using a device 
driver (Windows terminology)/kernel module (Linux terminology).  This allows for a 
more controlled and simplified testing environment.  The kernel module provides 
software functionality that cannot be performed by normal programs running on a 
computer.  For these thesis experiments, the kernel module does not perform or execute 
any functionality that could not be performed by hardware logic with direct access to the 
host system. 
3.3.4 Linux Kernel Module 
Typically, Linux device drivers for PCI-e peripherals are implemented as loadable 
Linux kernel modules.  A Linux kernel module (LKM) is a software program that can be 
dynamically loaded into the running Linux kernel while the kernel is running.  “Each 
piece of code that can be added to the kernel at run-time is called a module.  Each module 
is made up of object code that can be dynamically linked to the running kernel by the 
insmod program and can be unlinked by the rmmod program”[8].  Figure 4 shows how 
using the insmod program inserts the kernel module object code dynamically into the 
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kernel at runtime.  The object code that is inserted into the kernel is built using the Linux 
kernel API, and thus must be compiled against the kernel source tree present on the 
development system.  A kernel module is code executed by the processor in ‘kernel 
mode’ as opposed to ‘user mode’, which is the execution domain for application level 
programs.  By running in kernel mode and having access to kernel functionality, the 
kernel module has unrestricted access to system utilities and information.  The fact that a 
kernel module has unrestricted access to the host is important only in the capacity that the 
LKM has access to the Linux kernel application programming interface (API).  
 
 
Figure 8 Example of insmod and rmmod usage[8] 
 
3.3.5 Windows Device Driver 
The high level concepts of WDDs are very similar to that of the Linux kernel 
modules.  Like the LKMs, WDDs can be loaded by the running kernel.  The API 
functions for performing such tasks as inserting and removing the module are different, 
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but both the LKM and WDD require function callbacks that are called when the module 
code is dynamically loaded into the running kernel.  Like the LKM, the WDD runs in 
kernel mode and is given access to all data structures built by the Windows kernel as well 
as having access to all the functionality of the Windows kernel.  It is for this reason that a 
WDD can be used in place of a hardware device for the experimental portion of this 
thesis. 
3.3.6 PCITree 
PCITree is a Windows graphical shareware utility that allows users to have 
read/write access to each pci connected device’s memory mapped base address registers.  
While it is possible to obtain the memory location of the BAR’s of a pci device without 
using PCITree, this utility simplifys the experimental portion of the thesis. 
 
3.4 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this research is that a compromised PCI-e peripheral device, 
emulated by a WDD, can maliciously access disk drives on a host computer system with 
no discernable impact on the stability of the host system and less than five percent 
degradation of system performance while capturing host system data at full capacity.  
Furthermore, the attacks will not be detected by popular intrusion detection/prevention 











The experimental portion of this thesis consists of two major testing components.  
Part one involves compromising data from the host system’s serial ATA AHCI hard disk.  
Part two consists of performing a number of timing experiments which test the impact 
that the attacks have on the target system performance.  In the first  series of experiments, 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data are compromised as follows:  a) 
read transactions are issued to the disk drive to compromise the confidentiality of the data 
on the host; b) write transactions are issued to the host system’s  disk drive to 
compromise the integrity of the data on the host; c)  large targeted write transactions are 
issued to the data storage unit in order to compromise the availability of data on the host 
system by overwriting critical operating system data or the confidential data itself. 
In order to better control the environment of the thesis experiments, there is a 
WDD playing the role of the MDEV.  The WDD allows for commands to be sent to the 
disk drive.  Various commands can be sent to the disk drive using the WDD, with each 
command allowing for the execution of a different attack.  The WDD gives the disk drive 
commands by writing to the HBA’s command registers.  Upon receiving a command, 
data flows through the system as presented in Figure 2. 
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The WDD in these experiments is used to give commands to the HBA as well as 
verify that those commands have been carried out as expected.  In order to give 
commands to the HBA, host memory address space must be allocated which maps to the 
AHCI base address register (ABAR) on the HBA.  By using the WDD to write data into 
host memory that has been mapped to the HBA’s control registers, the WDD is able to 
give commands to the HBA.  AHCI ABAR memory space on the HBA that has been 
mapped to the host system’s RAM for communication between the WDD and the HBA 
itself.  For example, when a read transaction has been performed by the HBA on a 
specific disk drive, the WDD is able to read the contents of the address space that has 
been mapped from the HBA’s ABAR and verify that a read has occurred.  Figure 9 
shows a conceptual representation of the mapping from the HBA’s memory space into 
the host system’s memory space.  In order for the WDD to have access to the HBA’s 
registers, it must first determine where those registers have been mapped into the host’s 
system memory.  In order to simplify the process for the purposes of the experiments, the 
AHCI BAR of the HBA is determined with the use of PCITree.  This address is then hard 
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Figure 9 Mapping HBA ABAR register to host memory 
 
In order to control the MDEV, a user space program has been compiled which 
will provide commands to the MDEV.  In addition, the user space program provides data 
for the MDEV to write to the hard disk as well as maintain a data buffer so data may be 
read back from the hard disk into user space for verification. 
For the MDEV to give commands to the HBA, all AHCI protocol data structures 
must be setup.  The operating system already has the data structures setup; therefore, one 
way to have the hard disk execute  commands is to have them inserted into the operating 
system’s command list.  However, in order to avoid potential corruption, the data 
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structures are setup by the MDEV instead.  The data structures that will be setup include 
the command list and the command table.  These data structures will be created and 
stored within a buffer on the MDEV.  The next step will be to set the correct values in the 
Command Frame Information Structure (CFIS), located at offset zero from the command 
table. 
4.3 Experiment: Compromising the Disk Drive Overview 
 This series of attacks in the experimental portion of this thesis will involve 
compromising data on the host system’s hard disk drive.  The confidentiality of the host 
system’s hard disk data will be compromised by performing a read transaction on the host 
system’s hard disk.  The integrity of the data on the hard disk drive is compromised by 
having the MDEV write to the hard disk at some specified location.  To compromise the 
availability of data on the host system, the MDEV again performs write transactions on 
the hard disk. 
 In order to compromise the confidentiality of the information on the disk drive, a 
read transaction is performed by the MDEV.   In order to perform a read transaction, the 
proper values must be placed in the CFIS.  One important value that must be placed in the 
CFIS is the logical block address (LBA) of the data that you want to read.  This is also 
the data structure that the command to ‘read’ is specified.  Once this is done, the MDEV 
must replace the host system’s AHCI port 0 command list pointer with the pointer to the 
command list built by the MDEV.  In addition, the SACT and CI bit of the AHCI register 
must be set.  At this point, the MDEV waits until the disk drive completes the request.  
Upon command completion the data read from the disk is located in the MDEV buffer 
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specified by the PRD table (part of the command table).  At this point, the confidentiality 
of the information located on the hard disk has been compromised. 
 To compromise the integrity and availability of the information on the disk drive, 
a write transaction is performed by the MDEV.  As with the read transaction, the correct 
values must be written to the CFIS of the command table.  The queued write command 
must be specified in the CFIS as well as the LBA of the location on the hard disk that is 
to be written.  In addition, the write bit in the command header must be set.  At this point 
the MDEV must replace the host system’s AHCI port 0 command list pointer with the 
pointer to the command list built by the MDEV.  As with the read transaction, the SACT 
and CI bit of the AHCI register must be set.  The MDEV now waits for command 
completion to occur.  Once the command has been completed, the write to the disk drive 
is a success.  It is by this process that writing to corrupt integrity of data and availability 
of data happens. 
 Finally, in order to compromise the availability of information on the disk drive, a 
target write transaction is performed by the MDEV.  By having the capability to write to 
a specified region sector on the disk drive, any information on the disk could be over 
written.  The availability of the information on the target system could be attacked and 
compromised in various ways.  One option is to attack the entire system by over writing 
critical operating system structures and data stored on the disk.  This would cause the 
entire system to fail, thus making it impossible for authorized entities to get access to the 
data.  A second option would be to compromise the confidential data itself by overwriting 
it completely.  By destroying the data that authorized entities need , the availability of the 
data is compromised. 
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4.3.1 Compromise Information Confidentiality  
To test if the confidentiality of the hard disk had been compromised using the 
MDEV, a file of known data was created.  This file was then written to disk on the target 
system via a simple text file.  The file was composed of 16K (16,384) bytes of data.  The 
data was composed of 32 512 bytes divisions.  Each division was composed of a byte 
pattern.  The first 512 byte section was composed of the pattern “BAAD0000” 64 times, 
where the last four bytes (“0000”) represented the current 512 byte division of data.  
Therefore, the last 512 byte division was composed of the string “BAAD0031” 64 times.  
A user application program was written that accessed the physical hard drive directly 
using the Windows API.  This file determined the exact sector number of the data on the 
disk and reported it back to the user.  That sector number was then used to determine the 
LBA of the data.  When a disk is using 48-bit LBA addressing (the target system was 
using 48-bit LBA addressing), the sector number corresponds directly to the LBA for that 
sector.  That LBA number was then specified in the CFIS for a read transaction.  Another 
user space program was written to act as a controller for the MDEV.  That user program 
provided the MDEV with the command to read the hard disk.  When the MDEV executed 
the read command from the hard disk the data did correspond with what was written in 
the file.  Therefore, the confidentiality of the information located on the specified sector 
of the hard disk had been compromised. 
4.3.2 Compromise Information Integrity  
To test if the integrity of the hard disk had been compromised using the MDEV, 
the same 16K data file from the previous procedure was used.  The same user application 
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program that scanned the hard disk for sector numbers of the data was also used.  The 
user space control program setup a buffer with a specific signature to write to the hard 
disk at the specified LBA.  Once the LBA of the sector to write was set in the CFIS, the 
write transaction was ready to take place.  When the MDEV executed the write command 
to the hard disk, new data was written to the 16K file.  This was verified by opening the 
16K file with a text editor and viewing the contents of the file where the sector signature 
of “BAADXXXX” was previously located.  The new contents of the file did correspond 
with that of data buffer from the user space control program. 
4.3.3 Compromise Information Availability 
In order to test if the information availability of the data on the hard disk had been 
compromised using the MDEV, a very similar procedure to the compromise of disk 
integrity was used.  The same 16K file was used as the test file for this experiment.  The 
same user application that scanned the hard disk for the sector numbers of the data was 
used as well.  As with the compromise of information integrity experiment, the user space 
control program setup a buffer with a specific signature to write to the hard disk at a 
specified LBA.  Once the LBA of the sector to write was set in the CFIS, the write 
transaction was ready to take place.  The first write was specified to overwrite data in the 
test file.  This was to show that the system could compromise availability by destroying 
the data, thus preventing access.  When the MDEV executed the write command to the 
hard disk, new data was written to the 16K file.  This was verified in the same way that it 
was with the previous compromise of integrity experiment.  The file was opened with a 
text editor and viewing the contents of the file where the sector signature of 
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“BAADXXXX” was previously located.  The new content of the file did correspond with 
that of the data buffer from the user space control program.  The second test to determine 
that the availability of data on the hard disk had been compromised was to destroy the 
boot sector of the hard disk, thus preventing the system from booting up.  This was 
accomplished by overwriting the hard disk MBR located at sector 0 on the hard disk.  
The data that was written to that location was 512 bytes all containing the character “A”.  
The contents of the boot sector, when read by the MDEV, were in fact all A’s.  Upon 
rebooting the system, the BIOS posted an error message and the system failed to boot 
into the operating system. 
4.3.4 Experiment Metrics 
In order to gather measurable data from the experiments described in the previous 
three experiment sub-sections, two system qualities have been examined and measured.  
Those three qualities include system stability and system process execution timing.  In 
addition, another metric was gathered based on the success with which the system is able 
to detect changes made by the device. 
System stability was measured by monitoring a select number of processes on the 
system.  These processes have been monitored during the execution of experiments 1 and 
2 described in the previous two sub-sections.  In addition, these same processes were 
examined prior to executing commands from the MDEV in order to gather control data 
with which to compare and contrast the experiment data.  System process execution time 
was monitored by running a large task and measuring its execution time during 
transactions with the disk drive.  The processor intensive task of sorting a million integers 
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was performed during the MDEV’s attacks on the system.  The same process was 
executed prior to running the attacks in order to once again gather control data.  Finally, 
metrics were gathered concerning the success rate with which the host system was able to 
detect the malicious attacks performed by the MDEV.  Intrusion detection software, virus 
scanning software, and malware detection software have been run from the host system 
during the execution of these experiments to aid the host in detecting malicious activities. 
4.3.5 Experiment Results 
In compromising the information security qualities of the disk drive, the attacks 
presented in this thesis were all successful.  The confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of the information on the target system disk drive were all compromised.  However, 
target system stability was affected.  When performing a disk transaction data must be 
written to the AHCI memory mapped register of the HBA.  The data is written to the port 
0 memory range of the AHCI register.  The problem occurs when the operating system 
also attempts to write to the same slot in the register.  When this occurs, the operating 
system’s command times-out while the device services the MDEV’s request.  This event 
is logged by the system as a ‘hard disk command expired’ event.  If this event occurs 
multiple times in a row, the target system will crash.  In order to reduce the probability 
that this will happen, a delay has been inserted into the MDEV’s disk transaction 
algorithm.  Tests were run in order to determine the optimal time delay between MDEV 
disk transactions in order to maintain system stability and MDEV stealth while 
maximizing the amount of data that could be compromised.  The time delays between 
MDEV attacks that were tested were 10ms, 100ms, 500ms, 750ms, and 1000ms.  The 
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relationship between the MDEV attack time delay and stability of the system maintain an 
inverse relation.  As the time delay was increased, the frequency with which the system 
crashed was decreased.  Impact on system performance had a direct relation to MDEV 
attack time delay.  As the attack time delay was increased, system performance also 
increased.  The graph in Figure 10 shows the results of the tests that were run.  Each 
displayed point at the time delays of 10ms, 100ms, 500ms, 750ms, and 1000ms are an 
average of 5 for that delay value.  The control for these experiments was gathered using 
just the sort without any running attacks.  The control average sort time was calculated to 
be 8.24023 seconds.  
 
 
Figure 10 Attack Effect on System Performance 
 
 
 The results here show the time delay between MDEV attacks on the target system, 
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million integers.  As the delay between MDEV attacks increases, the time to sort a 
million integers decreases.  This shows the direct relationship between system 
performance and MDEV attack time delay.  The data in Figure 11 show the percent 
system performance degradation as the MDEV attack time delay is increased.   
 
 
Figure 11 System Performance Degradation 
 
 
 Here the data shows that as the MDEV attack time delay increases, the percent 







































In the hypothesis there were multiple claims as to the outcome of the 
experimental portion of this thesis.  Those claims were as follows: 
1.  A malicious device (MDEV) will be able to access disk drives on a host 
computer 
2. Disk accesses by the malicious device will have no discernable impact on the 
stability of the host system 
3. Disk accesses will have less than five percent degradation of system 
performance 
4. The disk accesses by the malicious device will not be detectable by intrusion 
detection/prevention software or by the host system itself 
Claim number one was proven to be true, as the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of data on the target system hard disk were all compromised.  Claim number 
two was not entirely correct.  In fact, the attacks on the system’s disk drive did have an 
impact on the stability of the host system.  When a conflict occurs between the operating 
system’s disk driver and the MDEV over which process will write to a command slot in 
the AHCI register of the HBA, the system could potentially crash altogether.  To 
compensate for this fact, a time delay between attacks on the host system’s hard disk was 
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inserted into the MDEV’s attack algorithm.  Tests show that as the time delay increases 
the system has a smaller probability of failing.  The most optimal attack time delay to 
balance the minimizing of system failure probability and the amount of data that is 
compromised was determined to be 500 ms.  The 500 ms delay has only a 0.026% system 
performance degradation (see Figure 11) and maintains a very close probability of system 
failure to the 1000 ms delay.  The following formula calculates the amount of time it 
takes to compromise 100GB of data on the hard disk given any MDEV attack time delay. 
 
                                       (Eq 1) 
 
Using this formula, the time to compromise 100GB of data using the optimal 
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In spite of the apparent long time it takes to compromise the data, an attack by a 
real world entity would be more targeted, with the purpose of retrieving specific data.  In 
this case the quality of the information would be very high while the size of the data 
containing that information could be low, thus decreasing the amount of data that needed 
to be compromised. 
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 Claim number three of the hypothesis states that the attacks on the disk drive will 
have less than a five percent degradation of system performance.  This statement was 
proven to be true.  This statement encompasses the system performance with regards to 
processor and memory usage.  It does not take into account the performance of the 
system during a disk I/O intensive task.  Figure 11 shows the system degradation during 
the processor intensive task of sorting a million integers.  It is apparent that as the MDEV 
attack time delay is increased, the system performance gets closer to the control.  No 
average system degradation displayed in Figure 11 is greater than even one percent, with 
the highest system degradation recorded being only 0.472 percent. 
 Finally, claim number four of the hypothesis states that attacks by the MDEV will 
not be detectable by intrusion detection/prevention software or by the host system itself.  
The host system ran Symantec Endpoint intrusion detection/prevention software.  This 
software was also an anti-virus software as well.  At no point during any of the test runs 
did Symantec Endpoint detect the MDEV attack activity.  When the operating system 
device driver and the MDEV both attempted to write to command slot 0 in the AHCI 
register, the operating system would log the event as a ‘hard disk command expired’.  
This log event does not in any way point to the MDEV or its activity.  The log simply 
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